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Abstract
Many of the Millennium Development Goals are not being achieved in the world’s poorest countries, yet only five
years remain until the target date. The financing of these Goals is not merely insufficient; current evidence indi-
cates that the temporary nature of the financing, as well as challenges to coordinating its delivery and directing it
to the most needy recipients, hinder achievement of the Goals in countries that may benefit most. Traditional
approaches to providing development assistance for health have not been able to address both prevalent and
emergent public health challenges captured in the Goals; these challenges demand sustained forms of financial
redistribution through a coordinated mechanism. A global social health protection fund is proposed to address
recurring failures in the modern aid distribution mechanism. Such a Fund could use established and effective stra-
tegies for aid delivery to mitigate many financial problems currently undermining the Millennium Development
Goals initiative.
The Millennium Development Goals and the
‘Charity’ Paradigm
Since the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were
established in 2000, an enormous effort has mobilized
resources to reduce poverty, discrimination and disease
in poor countries [1-3]. The Millennium Project’s2 0 0 5
Report expected that the Goals would be achieved by
the 2015 target date if high-income countries increased
official development assistance from 0.25% of donor
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2003 to 0.44% in
2006 and 0.54% in 2015, delivering approximately US
$120 billion each year of aid [4]. By 2007, the latest year
with available data, that financial goal was largely met:
development assistance totaled more than $120 billion,
of which $22 billion was allocated to health [3].
Despite this tremendous influx of resources, many
resource-poor countries continue to be unable to reach
the Goals, contrary to previous projections [1,2]. About
1 billion people are likely to remain in extreme poverty
in 2015, missing the poverty MDG target of halving the
number of people who live on less than $1 a day by
2015. More than 1 out of every 10 school-aged children
in the world remains out of school, such that the target
of achieving universal primary education is unlikely to
be met. Five years after the target date for eliminating
gender disparity in primary and secondary education,
marked disparities persist. Estimated child mortality is
twice the target rate, and maternal mortality is four-
times the target rate. Only some of the targets related to
HIV and tuberculosis seem likely to be met [5]. Further-
more, the MDGs cover only the small share of the total
burden of disease that is regularly measured in many
countries, ignoring the large burden of adult disability
and premature death that is increasingly driven by non-
communicable diseases.
It is commonly thought that the major reason why
countries cannot achieve improved health or social well-
being is that they are simply too poor: poverty traps
communities into a vicious cycle of inadequate capital
to build schools and businesses, and such communities
never have enough money to fund sustainable services
needed for health, education, or other basic community
infrastructure, which in turn is needed to have healthy
workers and business development that would produce
capital [2,6,7].
Leaders of the UN Millennium Project argued that
what was needed to address this problem was an influx
of capital to overcome the poverty trap (labeled by some
commentators as a ‘Big Push’) [8]. As one leader
described the strategy, “Once extreme poverty is
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income countries can begin to achieve self-sustaining
economic growth on their own.”[7] Thus the thinking of
decision-makers in global health and development has
been permeated by a heavy emphasis on a short-term
increase in financing; in short, their view is that with a
brief but large injection of capital, we can “help people
help themselves”. These are exemplary expressions of
the intended temporality of global health aid:
￿ Ann Veneman, then executive director of UNICEF,
on interventions to address child mortality: “These
plans and budgets should emphasise the continuum
of care from maternal to neonatal to child survival.
But they should also ensure that interventions are
prioritised and phased in according to the ability of
both the health system to deliver them at scale, and
of governments to afford them and to sustain them in
the longer term.”[9] [underline added]
￿ The World Health Report 2008 of the World
Health Organization: “In a significant number of
these low-expenditure, low-growth health economies,
particularly in sub-Saharan Africa and fragile states,
the steep increase in external funds directed towards
health through bilateral channels or through the new
generation of global financing instruments has
boosted the vitality of the health sector. These exter-
nal funds need to be progressively re-channelled in
ways that help build institutional capacity towards a
longer-term goal of self-sustaining, universal cover-
age.”[10] [underline added]
￿ The World Bank’s ‘Health Financing Revisited: A
Practitioner’sG u i d e ’: “Although the practical defini-
tion of fiscal sustainability may change for programs
supported by the [International Monetary Fund] and
[International Development Association], it is extre-
mely unlikely that such definitions will be divorced
from a country’s capacity to accommodate expendi-
tures financed with aid within the domestic budget
constraint in a reasonable period of time, while
maintaining sustainable levels of debt to GDP and
debt service to exports.”[11] [underline added]
The ‘Big Push’ approach is in line with a model in
which the welfare state exists at the national level but
there is free trade at the international level. From this
perspective, international assistance was seen as a tem-
porary necessity: “Despite misgiving about free trade and
the perceived necessity of aid to hasten economic devel-
opment, many policy-makers acted on the assumption
that the adoption of liberal economic policies would lead
to convergence in economic performance.”[12]
National welfare assistance is based on principals of
communal duties and rights-the recognition that
misfortunes occur perennially (natural disasters, slum
development, ghettoization, trade inequalities and other
perpetual creators of new or sustained poverty and bad
health), and therefore so should redistribution of funds
so that whole sectors of a population do not die or suffer
excessively from bad fortune, as long as certain criteria
can qualify individuals as rights-holders. In contrast,
international assistance is temporary by definition, rely-
ing on the goodwill of countries identifying themselves as
donors, even though much of the bad fortune that gener-
ates or sustains contemporary poverty is based on poli-
cies that cross borders [13]. As such, international
assistance is fundamentally similar to the charity that
preceded the welfare state; whi l ew i t h i n - c o u n t r yg o v e r n -
ance principles recognize the need for perennial redistri-
bution, cross-border governance mechanisms do not.
New Understandings of Slow and Unequal
Progress
New evidence suggests that the global charity model, to
help people help themselves temporarily rather than to
create a sustained pool of redistributed funds, has pro-
vided an insufficient response to the challenges prevent-
ing MDG progress.
The ‘poverty trap’ is being perpetuated rather than
broken
First, the ‘poverty trap’ is being perpetuated rather than
broken, as can be seen from the growing body of litera-
ture on this topic,[14] including work by those seeking
to understand long-term growth failure in very poor
countries, from the perspective of convergence and
divergence in the global economy,[15,16] and from
those with an interest in self-reinforcing inefficient equi-
libria, often linked to institutional failure, that prevent
countries escaping from poverty [17]. An additional fac-
tor is lack of resilience in the face of emerging economic
and environmental crises [18,19]. The UN Millennium
Update report (2009) reveals that progress towards the
MDGs is threatened by the recurrent reality of natural
and man-made disasters creating turmoil for the poor-
est. Recurrent instability in the global economic market-
place has undermined the benefits of global charity
repeatedly,[20] as seen previously during the Russian
and Asian economic crises [21-24].
The persistence of this poverty trap has many reasons,
but one fundamental etiology is the failure to support
those who lose out in the creative and destructive pro-
cesses of the global market [25]. In a global competitive
market, strong players are allowed or even encouraged
to invest their market gains in ways that give them
future comparative advantage, such as education,
research and development, and infrastructure: all factors
contributing to further economic growth. If left
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late within the hands of a few families and companies,
leading to further exclusion of those who were already
losing out in the creative and destructive processes of
the market [26]. Importantly, David Ricardo’st h e o r yo f
comparative advantage, the basis of modern free trade
theory and the idea of trade as a mutually beneficial
activity, assumed a fully competitive marketplace with-
out the ongoing within-firm trading systems and oligo-
poly/monopoly or trade rule-bending mechanisms that
are currently exhibited in the modern economic and
political system [27]. The current system does not cor-
rect the so-called ‘backwash effects’ of global centers of
economic growth (such as the United States, Western
Europe, and increasingly Brazil, Russia, India, China,
and South Africa): these centers attract capital and
human resources from their remote peripheries and
bend the rules to their advantage, but the fruits of their
growth do not return to the periphery [26].
Within rich countries, systems have been established
to protect those who have failed in the market place, for
example by providing unemployment assistance to tide
over those people who try to start a business but fail,
enabling them to survive until they return to employ-
ment. These systems encourage or even force the most
advantaged groups to share their gains with everyone
else, especially those with initial disadvantages, at least
to a certain extent. Through taxation and government
spending, the advantages of the strongest players contri-
bute to building up comparative advantages for the
entire population, in particular by protecting those indi-
viduals who have failed in the market place. They also
protect people against so-called catastrophic health
expenditures, and provide early childhood education to
their children, attempting to safeguard equality of
opportunity. Government-encouraged measures cause
so-called ‘spread effects’ of economic growth centers
[26]. However, in a global economy, the winners and
the losers are often in different countries and the system
of social protection extends only to the national border:
although backwash effects of economic growth centers
cross borders, spread effects rarely cross borders. For
every dollar of aid to Africa, about 2.4 dollars leaves
Africa in the form of illicit financial flows [28]. Accord-
ing to other estimates, up to 40% of the private wealth
of inhabitants of Africa is invested in other parts of the
world–legally or illegally [29]. This capital flight is in
addition to debt repayments of over $3 trillion generated
when international banks lent to governments that were
often directed by colonial and post-colonial dictators
who were put in place to provide natural resources and
labor to western states [30].
As another example of the globalised nature of risks,
the recent food crisis left many poor farmers unable to
sell their crops after a drop in prices (which, some econ-
omists argue, rose from the speculative actions of inves-
tors in rich countries);[20,31] these farmers lacked an
insurance system that would give them time to develop
a “comparative advantage” in another form of produc-
tive labor. Their countries are not only too poor to
finance such initiatives; even after a large increases in
aid, recurrent market failures and natural disasters can
overwhelm an entire country’s capital accumulation (as
seen recently in Greece), requiring aid from other
countries.
Current international support mechanisms, such as
the International Monetary Fund, have so far failed to
protect populations from the social consequences of
economic instability and backwash effects, often because
they are pushing countries towards becoming “self-suffi-
cient” so quickly that they force them to reduce their
remaining social welfare funds [32-35]. Short-term dis-
advantage accumulates–leading to chronic poverty, lack
of education, lack of health care, and poor nutrition. No
short-term increase in aid can counterbalance the
powerful global forces that continue to create losers; aid
as currently designed is therefore inevitably slated to fail.
International assistance does not reach the poorest
Second, a recent series of reports has revealed that
much aid is not reaching the poor, not just because of
corrupt governments, but because of diversion of aid for
other purposes and macroeconomic conditions imposed
on poor country governments [34,36,37]. Based on the
assumption that flows of aid are unreliable, major global
financial institutions have directed Ministries of Finance
to build up reserves, maintaining overall budget levels
unchanged (rather than increasing the health budget
when new aid is received) [38,39]. The consequences are
apparent in the finding that each additional $1 dollar of
health aid adds only about $0.37 to health budgets in
recipient countries, and < $0.01 (complete displacement)
in countries that under the advisorship of the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (when analyzed using the Organi-
zation of Economic Cooperation and Development’sa i d
database) [36,37,40].
International assistance is often short-term
Third, aid has generally focused on brief initiatives
directed at specific diseases and easily-demonstrated
outcome measures that can be achieved within short
time-frames, increasingly to fulfill the requirements of
private donors.
International assistance is misaligned with the actual
needs of populations
Fourth, aid being allocated by donors is misaligned with
the actual needs of populations, in spite of repeated
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frustration captured in their decision to amend practices
set out in the 2005 Paris Declaration and 2008 Accra
Agenda) [41,42]. The current system of resource alloca-
tion has failed to respond to the interconnected risks
that threaten progress. One example is that chronic
(long-term) health problems and their underlying social
and economic determinants of health are least likely to
be addressed by current aid programs, yet have recently
been shown to be critical determinants of progress
towards the MDGs [5,43]. Furthermore, aid is volatile,
and systems to pool funds to address the long-term
social and economic factors most affecting MDG pro-
gress, such as the Sector-Wide Approach, have had lim-
ited success due in part to volatility and unpredictable
commitments [44]. Many current donations are subject
to such extensive conditionalities and earmarking as to
be of limited utility, and focus so much on short-term
measureable outcomes that longer-term results seem
elusive.
Looking at the reality of one of the poorest countries
in the world, Ethiopia, helps understanding how these
challenges come together and explain difficulties achiev-
ing the MDGs:
￿ Ethiopia is a country of 80 million people with an
average Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of US$244
per person per year and a total health expenditure
level of $9 per person per year. To meet minimum
health requirements related to the MDGs, the coun-
try would need to achieve a level of health expendi-
ture of $40 per person per year according to the
WHO.
￿ The first obstacle in meeting this need is interna-
tional community support, which would have to
amount to $2.4 billion per year ($30, multiplied by
80 million people), gradually decreasing in line with
falling need. At present, no avenue exists to provide
funds on this scale for health system development,
and no aid channel has proven sustainable at such a
high level given shifting interest from external
donors, who already account for 42% of total health
expenditure in the country.
￿ The second challenge for the Government of
Ethiopia is to be convinced that it can sustain this
level of health expenditure, from domestic revenue,
w i t h i nar e a s o n a b l et i m e .T h a tw o u l dr e q u i r ee c o -
n o m i cg r o w t ho fm o r et h a n4 0 0 %o v e rt h en e x t1 0
years, to obtain an average GDP of $1,333 per per-
son per year in 2020; it would also require govern-
ment revenue to increase to 20% of GDP ($266 per
person per year) and require the allocation of gov-
ernment revenue to health to increase to 15% ($40
per person per year). At present, such budgetary
change is at odds with international financing insti-
tution recommendations, which specify to the Minis-
try of Health not to increase health budgets upon
receipt of new aid, given the unreliability of prior aid
disbursements historically.
￿ This specifies the third challenge: that the major
institutions making recommendations (often binding
by virtue of other loan agreements) to the Ministry,
particular the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund, would have to be convinced that
the first and second condition will be fulfilled, other-
wise the increased expenditure would not be allowed
due to fears that it would lead to new building pro-
jects and initiatives that would then go bankrupt as
unreliable aid dried-up (the phrase “not be allowed”
comes from the World Bank’sd o c u m e n t‘Health
Financing Revisited: A Practitioner’sG u i d e ’)[ 1 1 ] .
Hence, current aid systems lack of mechanism for
sustainable financing to produce effective system-
wide improvements to public health, even though
they aim to achieve the system-wide Goals specified
in the MDGs, and ultimately achieve sustainable
growth of poor countries.
In light of these limitations, some critics of the current
aid system suggest that the ‘Big Push’ approach will not
solve the problems the MDGs seek to eliminate; dispir-
ited by current obstacles, they argue aid is not part of
the solution, but is becoming the problem because of its
distortions of domestic priorities and interference with
markets [8,45-47]. These critics suggest that progress
could be achieved much faster by getting rid of aid alto-
gether, although others have suggested that these argu-
ments rely on distortion of data to suit pro-privatization
agendas [30].
A proposal for perennial redistribution
How can we overcome the limitations of the present
development paradigm? It is prudent to investigate what
has worked and to seek a pragmatic way forward.
Some of the greatest successes in global health have
come from building permanent capacity through long-
term channels for providing aid. The programs that are
on track for MDG achievement and have proved robust
in the face of continued short-term shocks are those
that have coordinated and sustained funding mechan-
isms. Most obviously, the Global Fund to fight AIDS,
Tuberculosis and Malaria (The Global Fund) has chal-
lenged the conventional notion of sustainability. When
public health experts argued that only HIV prevention,
not AIDS treatment, was a sustainable goal, people liv-
ing with AIDS and their advocates argued that this posi-
tion was simply untenable in the context of a globalized
market economy that produced the migration, slum
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epidemic: they argued that reliable national and interna-
tional funding for treatment was the only ethical
approach to addressing the survival of large number of
persons already infected with HIV.
As the Global Fund’s executive director, Michel
Kazatchkine, said in 2008: “The Global Fund has helped
to change the development paradigm by introducing a
new concept of sustainability. One that is not based
solely on achieving domestic self-reliance but on sus-
tained international support as well.”[48] The Global
Fund thus created a mechanism of redistribution of
wealth between countries that is intended to be peren-
nial. It is notable that while other MDGs remain far
behind their targets, progress towards the targets for
AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria has so far been more
promising [1,2]. This suggests that, to create a more
effective health aid system, a continuing redistribution
of wealth will be needed. We are aware of the fact that
the global AIDS response - and in its slipstream the glo-
bal response to tuberculosis and malaria - has been sup-
ported by an exceptional mobilization of civil society
groups around the world, which may not exist for wider
health issues. However, we believe that the impact of
this response should be convincing enough to adopt
similar approaches to wider health issues and ultimately
to wider social justice challenges.
A global social health protection fund?
A proposal has been made for such a permanent system of
resource redistribution through a global social health pro-
tection fund, similar to - but broader in scope than - the
Global Fund [49,50]. The proposed mechanism for such a
fund would be: (i) to assess contributions from member
states based on a weighted burden sharing formula, (ii)
provide recurrent financing to address persistent threats
to health and human rights of deprived populations, and
(iii) allocate resources using needs assessments so as to
harmonize aid with the burden of avoidable and unfair
mortality. It is not the objective of this paper to provide a
detailed blueprint for a global social health protection
fund, as disagreement on its features would stand in the
way of broad discussion of its underlying vision. In brief,
the proposal is that “some of the allocation mechanisms
used by the Global Fund might be built upon by a demo-
cratized and strengthened global social governance system
within the context of the sustainable resources available
from a global levy based on global taxation with funds
flowing through normal government budgets” [51]. A glo-
bal social health protection fund could include the three
abovementioned functions:
￿ To assess contributions from member states based
on a weighted burden sharing formula.I d e a l l y ,t h e
contributions would come from internationally
agreed taxation, including all countries. The tax on
airline tickets directed to UNITAID–a global scheme
to which several developing countries are contribut-
ing–could serve as an example to be further devel-
oped [52]. In the absence of such a system, the
agreed burden sharing between the donors to the
International Development Association of the World
Bank could be used [53]. The target would need to
be in line with recent estimates about international
assistance to achieve the health related MDGs, such
as the ones provided by the Taskforce on Innovative
International Financing for Health Systems [54].
￿ To provide recurrent financing to address persistent
threats to health and human rights of deprived popula-
tions. Like any national social health protection
mechanism, a global social health protection fund
would have to be based on agreed rights and duties.
The essential right of member states would be a right
to the international assistance needed to realize the
right. That presumes an agreement on the health-
related goods and services that are essential for the
realization of the right to health (and adapted to local
realities), and an agreement on minimum domestic
contribution. The Ghana Macroeconomics and Health
Initiative–proposing a health systems approach based
on the most prevalent causes of mortality and morbid-
ity–can be used as a reference for essential health
goods and services [55]. The Abuja Declaration can be
used as a reference for the minimum domestic contri-
bution [56]. In countries where the government is
unwilling to live up to its domestic duties (as interna-
tionally agreed), civil society would be encouraged to
submit its own proposals directly to the global social
health protection fund, in ways similar to the present
practice of civil society proposals to the Global Fund
to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria [57].
￿ To allocate resources using needs assessments so as
to harmonize aid with the burden of avoidable and
unfair mortality. A country-owned long-term health
plan or compact would form the basis of allocations
from the global social health protection fund, and
for the accountability for the allocations received.
On this point, the national strategies elaborated for
the International Health Partnership, and the related
‘joint assessment of national strategies’ processes can
be used as a reference,[58] if it includes civil society
as the Global Fund’s decisional platforms do [57].
Both processes involve many stakeholders, which
would allow the global social health protection fund
to remain a financing tool.
There are, of course, a number of practical issues to
be addressed. One is the relationship of such a fund to
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should there be a single fund or multiple ones? We
believe that the interlinkages among diseases and their
determinants argue for a single fund but we also recog-
nize the political realities that may make this difficult.
Where would the responsibility of such a fund stop,
given the importance of the wider determinants of
health? At this stage, these issues must be raised but
cannot be resolved.
Beyond the practical challenges of implementation, we
can expect many principled objections to such a fund,
but we believe they can be rebutted:
￿ A global social health protection fund would make
existing institutions such as WHO or the World
Bank redundant? The main roles of the WHO and
the World Bank are to provide technical assistance
and set priorities. Separating financing and analysis
could resolve potential conflicts of interests. In the
future, their financial roles are likely to remain
limited.
￿ Aid would become invisible or anonymous within
a global pool, and impede the ability to demonstrate
tangible results? Standardizing reporting and delivery
mechanisms will enable more effective analysis and
learning from aid success and failure. Similar to
pooling mechanisms within the World Bank and
Global Fund, donors can claim credit for their con-
tributions. Private donations would also continue to
exist alongside the global social health protection
fund.
￿ Global redistribution will distort markets? A global
social health protection fund would correct market
failures, and provide goods and services that have
positive externalities.
￿ The Global South will forever rely on Global
North? Mutual interdependency already exists in
markets, climate change, and global processes. A
global social health protection fund can redress
adverse dependency, as resources flow from the
South to the North. Over time, countries can gradu-
a t et op o s i t i o n sw h e r et h e yn ol o n gr e q u i r ea s s i s -
tance, but rather provide it to those with greater
needs. This has already occurred when borrowing
countries from the International Development Asso-
ciation of the World Bank became ineligible for
loans but now are donors.
A global social health protection fund challenges the
fundamental paradigm underpinning global efforts to
achieve the MDGs. Like any international development
program, the MDGs are rooted in a particular para-
digm–a series of prescriptive assumptions, often impli-
cit, about how people in different parts of the world
should assist each other (or not) in realizing their full
potential as human beings and as societies. The para-
digm that has been adopted since the adoption of the
MDGs was the idea that a Big Push out of poverty traps
could be achieved by a temporary influx of aid, in line
with the model of welfare states within nations and free
trade between them, leading to economic convergence.
Unfortunately, recent evidence has shown that such an
influx could not overcome the permanent forces that
continue to push populations into poverty traps [27]. In
response, just as states have created within-country
mechanisms to redistribute capital as a means of insur-
ing those who are at the losing end of the economic
marketplace, so we can create a system of protection
that can travel across borders to counterbalance the
resources and labor costs that travel from poor to rich
countries.
As with any international effort, the precise mechan-
isms and effects of a global social health protection fund
cannot be known until one is formulated and imple-
mented, but the failures of the existing approach suggest
that a reliable, coordinated and permanent mechanism
for the redistribution of wealth will be needed to
address the shortcomings of the present international
aid paradigm that have hampered efforts to achieve the
MDGs. In addition, such a fund has the potential to rec-
tify ongoing ethical dilemmas created by current models
of trade. Much as the Global Fund redefined notions of
sustainability for infectious disease programs, we believe
that a sustained redistribution of wealth through a glo-
bal social health protection fund could form one rational
approach to overall improvement of development assis-
tance for health.
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